In 1943, CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow took his radio audience along on a RAF bombing mission to Berlin.
- By Mark Bernstein
- Air & Space magazine, May 2006
NASM (SI NEG. #85-18328)
ROYAL AIR FORCE WING COMMANDER Jock Abercrombie and other pilots of Bomber Command gathered at mid-afternoon on Thursday, December 2, 1943, to find out the day’s weather, which was cloudy, and the day’s target, which was Berlin. On that night’s mission, Abercrombie’s four-engine bomber, an Avro Lancaster with the nose art D for Dog, would carry to the German capital five tons of high explosives and one passenger. The passenger was the chief CBS radio correspondent in Europe, Edward R. Murrow.
Murrow was likely the most influential private U.S. citizen during the Second World War. In London during the Blitz, he had his own, personal, finest hour. Each night, standing exposed on rooftops, he gave to an American audience of 20 million live coverage of the city’s bombardment and its citizens’ resilience. Introduced with the trademark phrase “This… is London,” Murrow’s reports converted many of his listeners from isolationists into supporters of the British cause. Speaking back in the United States in 1938, he told his audience, “Whether we like it or not, the answer to Europe’s problems will be found, not in Europe, but right here in the United States.”
Murrow would make his flight on D for Dog the subject of a 17-minute radio broadcast, the longest he gave during the war. With it, he transported his audience from their comfortable living rooms to the cold belly of a big black Lancaster. Listening to it now, 60-plus years later, we feel what he felt: the bumpy ride, the considerable fear, the mission accomplished, and the relief of safe return. (Click here to listen to the recording.)
The strategic bombing of Germany—of which D for Dog’s mission was a tiny part—remains a matter of debate among historians. Drawing upon military records, the recollections of crew members, economic data, and other sources, historians have both defended and condemned the policy. Murrow’s broadcast also makes a judgment, and it is interesting to hear the conviction in the newsman’s words after reading the contentious analysis published in the years since he spoke them. As historians I interviewed point out, such eyewitness reporting suffers from a shortage of available fact and the pressure of deadline. “What you can get from a broadcast is a powerful impression,” says Richard Overy, author of a dozen histories of World War II, including The Air War: 1939–1945. “You don’t get an answer to the broader questions historians ask: Why were the airplanes there? What were they doing? Did they have any effect?”
Yet eyewitness reporters like Murrow can provide what better researched interpretations may lack: a sense of participation in history. We feel that we are there with Murrow from the very first words of his broadcast: “Last night, some of the young gentlemen of the RAF took me to Berlin.”
The United Kingdom and Germany began exchanging bombs in August 1940, when German bombs intended for an airfield on the outskirts of London landed instead on the city. The U.K. retaliated with attacks on Berlin, and Germany launched the Blitz on London that, among other things, made Murrow a household name. Initially, the British missions against Germany did little more than show the flag—Britain’s bombers were few, their payloads small, and the navigation highly erratic. In late 1941, it was determined that only one aircraft in three managed to drop its payload within five miles of its target. The British adopted a policy of “area bombing” cities—later the subject of considerable controversy—in part because a city was the smallest target that British bombers, operating under the cloak of night, could identify.
By the time Murrow boarded D for Dog, strategic bombing had become central to Allied war policy. Between the fall of France in June 1940 and the landings in Italy in September 1943, no Western army engaged the Germans on the continent of Europe. Bombs were the only weapon available. As Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to Lord Beaverbrook, his minister for aircraft production, “We have no continental army which can defeat the German military power…. [T]here is only one thing that will bring [Hitler] down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland.”
Britain committed a quarter or more of its war production to strategic bombers. In February 1942, British military leadership gave command of this air arm to Arthur “Bomber” Harris, whose views of warfare were notably unromantic: “We are going to scourge the Third Reich from end to end. We are bombing Germany city by city and ever more terribly in order to make it impossible for her to go on with the war. That is our object, and we shall pursue it relentlessly.”