Hello, I'm Richard Whittle, and this week I'll be answering questions here about my new book The Dream Machine: The Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey. I think the saga of the Osprey, a "tiltrotor" that takes off and lands like a helicopter but flies like an airplane, is an important and extraordinary story. The Marines spent 25 years and $22 billion on the Osprey before they got it into service in 2007 in Iraq, where I flew with the first squadron that took it there. The cost of creating the Osprey also included 30 lives -- 26 Marines and four civilians -- that were lost in three crashes during its development. My book tells the stories of those tragedies, and of many of the individuals involved, as well as tracing the Osprey's emergence as one answer to a search for aviation's Holy Grail -- the perfect aircraft -- that began in the 1930s. Many people seem to think the Osprey was cancelled, or "crashes a lot," neither of which is true. Others think the Pentagon should cancel it, in part because it's a very expensive aircaft. But the Marines and the Air Force are enthusiastically flying Ospreys in Afghanistan today, and despite the V-22's sad history, major aircraft companies are working on tiltrotors for civilian travel that you just might see crossing the sky near you in the not too-distant future. So there's lots to talk about, and I hope you'll join me here on the Air & Space online book club.

Mr. Whittle, great book! I played a role in some of the events in the book and I think that you did an excellent job of pulling together interviews to explain what happened.

My question: what do you think should have been done better on the Osprey program? Here are some of my ideas:
1. The technology was immature and Full Scale Development (FSD) was launched prematurely. There should have been a Risk Reduction phase before FSD.
2. The USMC was too dependent on the success of the V-22. There should have been a low risk competitor to the V-22, a conventional helicopter such as an H-60 variant.
3. The fixed price development contract was inappropriate, given the high technical risk of the program.

Hello:
my name is Aurelio Vega and I´m from Spain.
I have not readen the book, but you can be sure that I´m going to get it, because I think that this type of machines will be the air transport system of the future, not only for the troops or for SAR missions...even for the comertial aviation,replaceing the regional turboprops aircraft for this role.

Thanks for writing, Aurelio. You might be interested to know that you aren't the only one, or the only European, who feels that way about the tiltrotor. AgustaWestland of Italy and Bell Helicopter, Boeing's partner on the Osprey, are flight-testing prototypes of a nine-passenger civilian tiltrotor called the BA609. Augusta's chief executive, Giuseppe Orsi, has said the BA609 should be in production by 2013 or 2014, and with European partners, AgustaWestland is also working on another tiltrotor called the Erica. I was present at Heli-Expo 2009, the industry's biggest trade show, in Anaheim, California, when Mr. Orsi said, “We believe the future is in the tiltrotor.” I hope you enjoy The Dream Machine.

Thanks for your question, Ken. There isn't enough room here to answer your question in full, but here are what I see as the main mistakes:
1. The program started in 1982 with overly ambitious requirements because, originally, the Osprey was going to be used by four armed services for ten different missions. The Army has no plans to buy any Ospreys today, but in the beginning, that service was a major player in the program, and the Army wanted the Osprey to do troop transport and medevac missions as well as an electronic spying mission called SEMA. The Army dropped out in 1987, and a lot of requirements went with it. Others had to be dropped over the years, but much time and money was spent trying to meet them early on.
2. Bell and Boeing began with totally unrealistic cost estimates (and overran their development contract by $300 million).
3. I'm not sure the Osprey went into Full Scale Development prematurely, but I agree that the fixed-price contract for FSD was a mistake. It was supposed to keep the government from demanding design changes, but didn't. It also led to major disputes between Bell and Boeing -- a problem created by the fact that they had a 50-50 partnership to build the Osprey, which left neither in charge.
4. Dick Cheney tried to cancel the Osprey starting in 1989, and continued to try even after it became evident in the first year or two that Congress wasn’t going to let him. That starved the program for resources and put it behind schedule at least four years.
5. After they defeated Cheney, the Marines felt they had to press to get the Osprey into service. As a result, testing was inadequate, and may have caused one of the crashes.
One of the main difficulties, of course, was that the Osprey's rotors had to be sized to fit on an amphibious assault ship to do the Marine Corps mission but the cabin had to carry 24 troops. As you know, I go into the reasons for that and its implications in some detail in the book.

What was it like to fly with the Osprey squadron in Iraq? Were you nervous?

Thanks for your question, Joe. No, I wasn't nervous at all, for a number of reasons. (Just to be clear, I was only a passenger, riding in a fold-down jumpseat between and slightly behind the pilots.) First, I'd flown in the Osprey before, the first time being in 2005 at New River Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina, after the Osprey had been redesigned and retested to solve the problems that led to its two crashes in the year 2000. I was confident that this revamped Osprey was safe. (I describe that 2005 flight, by the way, as well as the one in Iraq, in my book.) Second, when I was in Iraq, December 2007, things were pretty peaceful in that part of the country, Al Anbar province, so there was very little risk of us being shot at or hit. Finally, even if the insurgency hadn't been quiet in that part of Iraq at the time, I'd much rather fly in the Osprey than a helicopter in a combat zone. Military helicopters, aside from being slower, (about 120 knots compared to the Osprey's cruising speed of around 250), usually fly low in combat zones to increase their chances of flying past any threat on the ground before the enemy sees them. If they ARE seen, though, that low altitude can make them vulnerable to small arms fire. When I rode in the Osprey in Iraq, the tactic the Marines used was to tilt the rotors forward and transition to the airplane mode of flight very quickly after takeoff, climb rapidly, then cruise at 8,000 feet or more. That put them out of range of small arms and RPGs. So I felt very safe flying in the Osprey in Iraq.

I'm fairly familiar with the Marine Corps mission and it's impact on the program from previous tidbits of information, but I don't know much about the Air Force mission for this aircraft. Can you tell me about the AF mission and how it might have impacted development?

Mr. Whittle,

I have not yet read your book so you may have already answered this question.
Would it be correct to say that one of the contributing factors in the 'vortex ring state', crash, was the fact that the pilots operating the V22 at the time originated from an essentially fixed wing background rather than one from rotary and had not been fully exposed to the vageries of helicopter operations?
I am 100% behind the V22 & the Tiltrotor concept. The V22 suffered unjustly at the hands of politicians and from ill informed rhetoric by nay sayers on the web. I believe the V22 will save many lives and perform extraordinarily well in any theatre it operates. The Tiltrotor in a commercial role, given the opportunity, will be a game changer.

Greetings Mr. Whittle!

The V-22 is a truly wondrous machine. Today, anyone can easily read about the troubled development of this aircraft (and we all know how sensationalism sells). But what the general public fails to recognize are the thousands of flight hours flown, the outstanding safety record (as a whole), and the absolute potential that the tiltrotor has to offer. The dream of flying is a common reality today, only because people were willing to apply modern science and technology and take the necessary risks. Can you imagine life without commercial airliners?

I propose that folks spend a little time researching the "positive" concerning this platform. Even more-so, perform a comparison of the development concerning other advanced-technology aircraft. May I recommend the Harrier or even the F-16??? Both of which are now highly specialized, multi-role, capable aircraft. One might be surprised at what they find (statistically)...

I am proud to say I have flown the Osprey. I can say without reservation that it is a VERY capable and safe platform with fantastic possibilities. Though this aircraft is operational, it is still being developed (exactly like every-other military aircraft)! There will be future improvements, enhancements and modifications that will make the tiltrotor even more capable, reliable and safe. The current version (B-model), incorporated major changes and improvements due to lessons-learned while "maturing" the A-model. This will undoubtedly continue in future versions (C, D, E model, Block 20, 30, etc.).

Is it possible to publish some of the V-22 achievements? Having flown a CV-22B from Hurlburt Field, Florida to Bamako, Mali (and back), I can assure you that there are more than a few noteworthy accomplishments and milestones that this aircraft and her crews have completed.

Thank you for taking the time to answer our questions.

Alan Schedin asks a good question. The Air Force version of the Osprey is the CV-22B, used almost exclusively for special operations. I say "almost" because CV-22B operations obviously include training, the inevitable ferry flights and the like. The CV-22B is flown by the 8th Special Operations Squadron, the unit our commenter PJ must have been flying for on that trip to Mali and back. Being special operations, Air Force missions are almost always classified, but my understanding is that the Air Force uses its Ospreys mainly o infiltrate and exfitrate troops on special operations, which right now largely means raids on insurgent targets in Afghanistan. An 8th SOS CV-22B carrying Army Rangers on a mission like that crashed last April in Afghanistan, killing four of the 20 aboard. You can read many of the details of that event, and about some controversy surrounding it, in an article I've written for the February issue of Rotor & Wing magazine, (online subscriptions are free). You can also read the Air Force's report here: www.afsoc.af.mil/accidentinvestigationboard/index.asp. (That accident, by the way, happened 10 years to the day after the Osprey's last fatal crash.)
Much of the additional gear the CV-22B carries compared to the Marine Corps's MV-22B is classified, as are some of its other differences. I'm told, though, that a couple of major differences are that the CV-22B has extra fuel tanks and carries electronic air defenses (countermeasures) and avionics the MV-22B doesn't have.
The Air Force mission probably affected the Osprey's design and development most at the micro level. Though it's been joint in name throughout its history, the Osprey was really developed by and largely for the Marines.

Thanks for your question, too, Alan Parsons. Chapter Nine of my book tells the story of the April 8, 2000, crash at Marana, Arizona, which occurred during operational testing, in great detail. The pilot, Maj. John "Boot" Brow, was primarily fixed-wing -- he had 3,400 hours flying KC-130 tankers -- but took about 60 hours of helicopter training when he joined the Osprey test team. The copilot, Maj. Brooks "Chucky" Gruber, was one of the Marines's most experienced CH-53 helicopter pilots. At the time, no one had a huge number of hours in the Osprey because only a handful of V-22s existed. Vortex ring state was the aerodynamic cause of the crash, but the investigation blamed it on "human factors." Some people still have the impression that "human factors" means "pilot error," but if you read my account of the crash, I think you'll see why I think that's unfair to Brow and Gruber. For one thing, in the rush to get the Osprey into service, barely any testing of how vortex ring state would affect it had been done. (As you probably know, VRS is a condition a rotor can get into if it descends into its own downwash too quickly, which can cause the rotor to stop producing adequate lift.) That was remedied later in a series of High Rate of Descent tests, also described in my book. Afterward, visual and verbal warnings were added to the cockpit to keep pilots from inadvertently descending too quickly at slow speeds. The Osprey flight placard at the time warned of VRS but didn't emphasize it. I don't think anyone can say whether Brow's fixed-wing background was a contributing factor. I do think it's fair to say that the accident might not have happened if his Osprey had been equipped with the verbal and visual warning devices added later.

Thanks for writing, PJ. If you take a look at The Dream Machine, I think you'll find that I've already published some of the V-22's achievements, including a brief account of your mission to Africa that appears in the Epilogue. Since the book came out, in fact, I've been pleased to receive emails from quite a few Osprey pilots thanking me for telling the good along with the bad and ugly in the V-22's story. One of the most gratifying comments I've gotten came in a conversation I had with an Osprey pilot still in training, who told me, "The most important thing I got from your book was, 'Be aware of the limitations of your aircraft.'" There's indeed been a lot of hype and hysteria about the Osprey over the years. I tried very hard in The Dream Machine to cut through that and just tell the truth about the aircraft. The Osprey's far from perfect, as you know and note, but it does offer unique capabilities, and I'd gladly fly in it again any day. At the same time, I think it's important to learn the lessons of its development. As the philosopher George Santyana famously said, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

Are you Richard Whittle, at one time a resident of Chapel Hill, NC? If so, all I have to say is "Down, puppy".

The airplane appears to be one where the difference between a successful pilot and a tangled mass of wreckage may be very small. Is the learning curve for this machine overly steep?

Thanks for writing, Paul, and good to hear from you after so long. Your question is one a lot of people have, probably because looks can be deceiving, and the Osprey looks awkward. But the inference is incorrect. Contary to popular notions, there've only been four fatal Osprey crashes since it first flew in 1989. Three occurred during its development and the fourth in Afghanistan last year. The Osprey’s death toll has been tragically high, though, because it's a troop transport, and in one crash alone, 19 Marines were killed. Since flaws in the developmental version were fixed, and with the exception of the crash in Afghanistan, the Marines and Air Force have flown their Ospreys more than 70,000 hours safely since 2002. So its safety record isn't nearly as bad as its reputation.
As for the learning curve, Osprey pilots tell me it's relatively easy to fly, in part because it has triply redundant computerized flight controls that handle what otherwise would be a very tricky transition from helicopter to airplane flight. I'm also told that while its rotors can kick up extraordinary amounts of dust, the Osprey is actually easier to land in brownout conditions than military helicopters in use today. Unlike them, the Osprey has an electronic "hover page" display that tells the pilot where the aircraft is -- altitude, speed, etc. -- along with wind direction, wind speed and other information. So he (or she, for there are women Osprey pilots) can land safely even when he can't see much outside the cockpit. The biggest valid criticisms of the Osprey today don't have to do with safety but with reliability – how often parts break -- and cost. The CV-22B that crashed in Afghanistan cost $87 million. The Marines pay about $63 million “flyaway cost” per Osprey under the latest contract. The Army buys Black Hawk helicopters for $27 million or so. But a Black Hawk can't fly at 250 knots.

Is the Osprey difficult to fly?

I was an V-22 Osprey flight test engineer, not a test pilot, but I did get to fly the simulator and I am a civilian pilot. The V-22 is not particularly difficult to fly, but (1) it does have certain unique characteristics, and (2) tactical employment is difficult even if basic aircraft control it not. Point (2) is not specific to the V-22; it is true of every military aircraft.

It should also be noted that in very real sense, pilots don't control the V-22. The pilots provide inputs to the flight control system, then the flight control system calculates what control movements are required to make the V-22 do what the pilots want it to do. There are no direct connections between the pilots and the ailerons, rudders, elevators, nacelles and proprotors. For a variety of reasons, the V-22 is actually easier to fly than a typical helicopter.

I completely agree with Richard. The V-22 is a terrific aircraft; alas it is also extremely complicated which has adverse implications for cost and reliability. The question is whether its unique capabilities, which are useful for some but not all missions, justify the extra cost required to acquire, maintain and operate it.

Hi Mr. Whittle,
It appears that you may have upset those who hold both the ‘pro’ and ‘con’ extremist views with your book. It doesn’t show the Osprey to be an aircraft that will be the ultimate ‘best of both worlds’ aircraft set to replace helicopters and/or airplanes in the future; and it presents facts that show the vast majority if internet/media hype against it is not true.

However, the overall ability of the public at large to understand the technology in an open an honest manner appears to be blocked and distorted on a grand scale. True unbiased analysis almost never makes it to the public domain. It is extraordinary to many of us in the industry that 98% of those people you talk to in aviation are very positive when it comes to the future outlook of tiltrotor technology and its capability to do things that no other aircraft can do, and yet that ‘silent majority’ viewpoint of aviation professionals is almost non-existent on the internet or in media reports. A hand full of those who hold a negative view appear to spend endless amounts of time dominating the internet blogs making exaggerated and false claims while using slander and unfounded criticism to chase away anyone who has actual experience or possesses true knowledge of the technology. The inevitable result is an extreme distortion of the facts being presented to the public.

Is there anything that can be done to bring a truly fair and unbiased representation of tiltrotor capabilities and limitations to the public?

I thoroughly enjoyed the book.It skillfully explains the long development processes of leading flight technology. Just a suggestion for later editions. Since the XV-15 was used for years as a sales demonstrator , why not include its photo rather than the XV-3 in the all too brief photo section.

Thanks for those interesting insights, Ken.

Thanks for those thoughts, RD, and I agree with your observations. I certainly don't have the answer to how the debate on the Osprey -- or these days any other issue -- can be brought down from the heights of hysteria to the garden of reason where ground truth lies. Those who shout loudest and say the most violent things, unfortunately, almost always get the most attention. As for the media, the definition of news is "man bites dog," not "dog bites man," so aircraft crashes get a lot more attention that aviation advances. I hope my book makes some small contribution to bringing some reason to the debate over the Osprey. But I also think those who have hands-on expertise should make a greater effort to share what they know, and without sugar-coating things. If you want your story told, you have to tell your story. If you want your story believed, you have to tell the truth.

Thanks, Paul O'Brien, and I'm glad you enjoyed the book. I'm disappointed myself at the omission of an XV-15 photo. As it turned out, for production reasons I was only allowed the 16 photos that made it into the book. After a lengthy discussion with my editor, it was decided that the XV-15 photos we had weren't as good as those 16, and I didn't want to lose any of them, either. I'm not sure that can be revisited in future editions. But I like the XV-3 photo, which REALLY looks like a helicopter-airplane hybrid, don't you agree?

It's close-of-business on Friday, so my time on this valuable space is over, unfortunately. Many thanks to Air & Space for making The Dream Machine their January selection and for giving me the chance to do this. I've really enjoyed it. Many thanks as well to those of you who wrote in for taking the time and trouble to do that. I'll sign off now with one last thought. If you haven't read The Dream Machine yet, I sincerely hope you will, because quite apart from the fact that I wrote this book, the saga of the V-22 Osprey is a truly incredible story.

Rich,
Your accuracy and attention to detail to write the truth about an aircraft that took 25 years to deliver is most noteworthy. You write with such "technical ease" by breaking down "aviation speak" for all to understand. As a former MV-22 Operational Test Pilot, your book has been a great gift for me to give to family and friends and I can not thank you enough for the respect that you gave my fallen brothers in your book. I really like your response above concerning the VRS question. The MV-22 has already proved it's immense value to current combat operations and the Marine Corps. The aircraft's accomplishments since fleet introduction reflects great success in exploiting the long awaited tiltrotor technology. Your book does an excellent job of describing what it took to develop the aircraft and more so, the frustrating bureaucracy of the acquisition process at the time. Great Job, and I look forward to your next book!